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1.  Introduction 
 
The paper gives a proof of the existence and the uniqueness of price equilibrium in a multi-
product, multi-firm competition framework. In fact, the impact of store location of a multi-store 
firm, or that of its competitors, on the price setting strategies of firms, is a subject that has been 
little explored in the industrial organization literature1. The standard models of horizontal 
differentiation (e.g. Hotelling, 1929, Salop, 1979) constitute an appropriate framework to treat 
this question. However, not many models have retained the original structure to study pricing 
strategies in the context of multi-store competition2. Levy and Reitz (1992) analyze the pricing 
strategies of firms in a multi-product framework, in which one firm controlling two stores is in 
competition with two mono-store competitors, using the circular model of Salop (1979). More 
recently, Giraud-Héraud et al. (2003) have studied price settings in the context of a single multi-
product firm interacting with several mono-product competitors. The present paper generalizes 
these two contributions by identifying the unique price equilibrium that prevails in a complex 
context whatever the number of multi-product firms in competition, the number of stores owned 
by each firm, or the location of these stores. The main properties of the equilibrium that leads to a 
spatial differentiated pricing over the product line of each firm are also characterized.0 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Section 3 contains our 
main existence and uniqueness results, and equilibrium properties. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.  Bertrand-Nash equilibrium with multi-store firms 
 
Consider a standard circular model of spatial differentiation, generalized for multi-store (or multi-






q n N  the total number of stores, and we assume that all stores (denoted by i=1,…,N) are 
spread over a circle of perimeter d. Each store i sells the same product, but in different locations. 
Let xi denote the location of store i, that is the curvilinear abscissa  ] d , 0 [ xi∈  with x x i j ≠  if 
ij ≠ . Store i sells the product at price pi (i=1,…,N)  with  zero (marginal) production cost. 
There is a continuum of consumer types θ  distributed with unit density over [0,d]. The 
transportation cost incurred by consumer of typeθ , when he consumes product xi rather thanθ , is 
given by  |) x (| C i − θ where ||
i x θ − denotes the geodesic distance between θ  and i. 
Figure 1 below illustrates the model. In this figure, firm F1 holds stores i =1,2,3,4; firm 
F2 holds stores i = 5; Firm F3 holds stores i = 6, i = 7; etc. Note that, in our general model, firms 
may, or may not, hold stores with adjacent locations. 
 
                                                 
1 The terms “store” and “brand” are used equivalently in this paper.  
2 A number of articles have explored this question modifying certain assumptions of these models, either with 
respect to the preferences of consumers (Klemperer, 1992 , Janssen et al., 2005) or with respect to strategic 
conjectures on the nature of competition (e.g. Cournot competition in Debashis et al., 2002). Thus, the arbitrage of 
the consumer between the costs of covering the distance to buy a commodity and its price, a fundamental assumption 
in the models of  Hotelling (1929)  and Salop (1979), does not figure in these papers.    
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Figure 1 : Circular model with multi-store firms 
 
 
Let r denote the reservation price common to all consumers. Consumers are allowed to buy 
one unit of a differentiated good, so that a consumer of type θ  purchasing a product xi at price pi 
obtains a utility of: 
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Let  Zi,j be the shortest geodesic distance between two stores i and j (for j > i 
)} x x d ( ), x x inf{( Z Z i j i j i , j j , i + − − = = ).  For two adjacent stores i and i-1, let 




= λ , for i = 1,…,N  
with Z0,1 = Z1,N.  
 
For any market price vector, p = (p1,…,pN), let Di(p) and Bi(p) = pi Di(p) denote the 
demand and the profit of a store i respectively. By determining the location of the consumers 
who are indifferent between buying from store i-1 or i, and between store i and i+1, the demand 
faced by store i can be expressed as follows:  
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Since the demand Di(p) depends only on pi, pi-1 and pi+1 among all the components of 
price vector p, it is useful to distinguish all the adjacent stores owned by a same firm Fq in order 
to investigate the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium between the Q firms. In order to do this we 
introduce some definitions. 





k n N .  
Range k of firm i,  k ℜ :  k ℜ  is the k
th set of neighboring brands belonging to the same firm 
i such that only two of these brands (the peripheral brand of the range) are directly exposed to 
brands owned by other firms.  





mj ℜ =− + for even values of nk 









ℜ= −+  for uneven values of nk (in 
this case there is only one central store). 
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Peripheral stores of the range ℜk : The stores i , i=1,…,N such that d(i) = 0. 
 














q   F F i
i (p) π (p) B   (p)
q F π denote the profit of a firm Fq.  
 
From the above, it is clear that the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium between the Q firms can be 
analyzed through the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium between the K ranges. Each firm is indifferent 
about the number of ranges possessed by the other firms. With the assumption that all of 
products have positive market shares, the best response for each range  } 1 n j , , j { k k − + … = ℜ  only 
depends on the two prices of its neighboring stores, namely pj-1 and 
k n j p + . Moreover, as will be 
shown, the equilibrium prices of each store will depend only on its exposure to competition.  
 
Recall that a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is defined by a N component vector of prices 





* … =  such that: 
 





i i N 1 q π π ≥ = … = ∀ ∀ ∉ ∈  (6) 
 
Then we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition When ( 1,..., n x x ) are fixed, there exists a unique price equilibrium with a non-
zero market share for each store.  
  4
 
Proof : Given that store i's profit only depends on its own pricing and on the prices of its 
neighbors, the best response for the ranges can be isolated. For ℜk = {j,j+1,…,j + nk -1} we can 
show that 
k ℜ π is concave in  ) p , , p ( 1 n j j k− + … , since the Hessian matrix  of 
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Let  m ∆  ( m = 1,…,nk) denote the principal minor of  ) (
k
2
ℜ ∇ π  of order m. We have 
) ( 1 j j 1 + + − = λ λ ∆  and  2 m
2
1 j m 1 m j m 1 j m m   ) ( − − + − + − + − + − = ∆ λ ∆ λ λ ∆ , for m = 2,…,nk where  1 0= ∆ . Therefore, 
we can easily demonstrate by induction that  ∏
=





1 m m j m λ ) 1 (  ∆ λ ∆  for m = 1,…,nk.  
For odd values of m, we have  m ∆ < 0 (since  0 i λ >  and  0 0 ∆ > ) and for even values of m, 
we have  m ∆  > 0.Thus, the matrix  ) (
k
2
ℜ ∇ π  is negative definite.  








ℜ = =…+ −  and 
obtain the best response to the prices  ) p , p (
k n j 1 j + −  for each range ℜ k as below: 
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Then from (8), all the first-order conditions for the set of ranges, ℜk ; k = 1,…,K can be 
summarized in the standard form Ap = B  where A and B are matrices and p is a vector. We have 
B ≥ 0. since  0 i λ >  for all i. Applying McKenzie's theorem (1959 theorem 4, p. 50) a necessary 
and sufficient condition for Ap =B to have a unique solution p  ≥ 0  is that 
A = (ai,h)i=1,.,N;h=1,.,N has a quasi-dominant diagonal or the following properties are 
verified : 
 
(P1) There exist  dh > 0 such that   ) N , , 1 h (     | a |   d     | a |   d
h i
h , i i h , h h … = ≥∑
≠
  
(P2) When  ai,h = 0, given  H h∈  and  H i∉  for some set of indices H, the strict inequality 
holds for some  H h∈ . 
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We can verify the property (P1) taking dh = 1 for all h, h = 1,…,n and furthermore confirm 
that there is no set of indices H such that ai,h = 0 given  H h∈  and  H i∉ . This completes the 
proof. 
   
3.   Properties 
 
We describe now the main properties of the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Without loss of 
generality, we suppose the products are symmetrically differentiated inside each range : 
 
k 1 i , i k k k k k Z Z    } 1 n j { i       } 1 n j , , 1 j , j { ≡ − + − ℜ ∀ ∃ − + … + = ∀ℜ + ∈ Z  (9) 
 
There is the same product differentiation between the members of each range, but the 
differentiation between the ranges (that is between the peripheral stores of two ranges possessed 
by two different firms) is not necessarily the same.    
 
Let  k Z indicate the differentiation between the range ℜ k= {j,j+1,…,j + nk -1} and the 
range  ℜk+1  ) Z Z (
k k n j , 1 n j k + − + = . Therefore, the solution of system (8) takes the form 
γ β α + + − + + − = ) 1 j i ( ) 1 j i ( p
2
i  with constant coefficients. Using (8) and after identification of the 
constant coefficients, we have the following formulation for the equilibrium prices: 
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In figures 2 and 3 we focus on a duopoly configuration with only one multi-product firm 
} n , , 1 { F 1 1 … = ℜ =  and a mono-product  } N { F 2 2 = ℜ =  with N = n +1, in the market. We consider the 
case where any two stores of a firm are equidistant : Z1 = Z. The distance between store 1 and N  
  6
is  2 Z  and the distance between n and N is  1 Z  and we have  d Z Z Z ) 1 n ( 2 1 = + + − . 
Figures 2 and 3 show the kind of price and profit differentiation that could emerge in two 
polar cases: first, the symmetrical situation when  12 Z Z = (figures 2a and 2b) and second, the 
asymmetrical situation, when  1 Z  is significantly greater than  2 Z  (figures 3a and 3b). 
The variation of prices along the range depends on the degree of differentiation between 
the competitors and on the number of stores within the range. A multi-store firm chooses its 
brands’ price vector as a function of its degree of exposure to outside competition. The closer a 
brand is to outside competition of another firm, the lower its price and vice versa.  
In the symmetrical situation, the prices inside the range are increasing from the periphery to 
the center of the range. Peripheral stores offer the lowest prices while central stores protected 
from the external competition offer the highest prices. We show in figure 2b that for high values 
of  2 Z  and n, the highest profits in the range ℜ1 are those of the peripheral stores because of the 
greater market share that they capture. The price at store N is always below the prices at any 
store of the multi-store firm, but its profit is the highest in the industry, if its product is 
sufficiently differentiated. 
For the asymmetrical situation, we suppose there is no differentiation between store 1 and 
store N, taking 2 0 Z = , while store n is the most differentiated store from the rival N, taking 
1 2
d Z = . Figure 3a shows the variation of prices, which are increasing from store 1 to store  n. 
Store n not only charges the highest price, but also enjoys the largest market share, thereby being 













Figure 2a: Price Variation 
Parameter configuration a = d = 2 and  /10 ; 9 ( 10)
2 1













Figure 2b:Profit Variation 
Parameter configuration a = d = 2 and  /10 ; 9 ( 10)
2 1












Figure 3a: Price Variation 
Parameter configuration a = d = 2 and  0; / 1 6 9( 1 0 )
2 1

















Figure 3b: Profit Variation  
Parameter configuration a = d = 2 and  0; / 1 6 9( 1 0 )
2 1




4.   Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper, we extended the standard duopoly model of spatial differentiation to a multi-store, 
multi-firm competition. We resolved the complex problem of identifying and confirming the 
existence and uniqueness of a price equilibrium for symmetric and asymmetric locations of 
brand portfolios of multi-product firms. The results obtained with multi-store firms are different 
from those obtained with single-store firms. The price variation over stores emerges as a function 
of the degree of the substitution of the portfolios of the different multi-product firms. Such 
results are in the line with some observations and empirical works (see for example Barron et al 
(2000) and Netz and Taylor (2002)). In many final product markets the multi-store phenomenon 
is gaining ground. Therefore, the proof of existence of an equilibrium in prices and its 
characterization contributes to a better understanding of the determinants of pricing strategies of 
firms in such markets, which in turn could be useful for the formulation of competition policy in 
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